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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Aswa Mills was convicted in the Virgin 
Islands Territorial Court1 of two counts of first-degree 
                                              
 1 The Virgin Islands Territorial Court is now known as 
the Virgin Islands Superior Court. 
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murder, one count of attempted robbery, and two weapons 
offenses.  A three-judge panel of the District Court for the 
Virgin Islands affirmed his convictions on appeal.  See United 
States v. Mills, 3:02-cr-157, 2013 WL 6072020 (D.V.I. Nov. 
14, 2013) (per curiam).  On appeal to this Court, Mills argues 
that his right to due process was violated by prosecutorial 
misconduct; that the trial court’s jury instructions regarding 
self-defense were fatally flawed; and that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance.  While we agree with Mills 
that the prosecutors engaged in serious misconduct, we 
conclude that this misconduct did not render his trial 
fundamentally unfair and that his other claims do not warrant 
relief on appeal.  We therefore will affirm the District Court.   
I. Jurisdiction 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C.     
§ 1613a(a).  We have jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) 
and (d).  See generally Gov’t of the V.I. v. Davis, 561 F.3d 
159, 160 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).   
II. Facts and Procedural History 
 On January 13, 2000, the victim, Boniface Clement, 
was shot and killed in front of his home.  Mills was arrested 
for the killing soon thereafter and charged in Virgin Islands 
Territorial Court with six counts.  Counts 1 and 2 charged 
first-degree murder on premeditation and felony murder 
theories, respectively.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 921, 
922(a)(1), (2).  Count 3 charged the carrying of a dangerous 
or deadly weapon with the intent to use it against another.  
See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2251(a)(2)(B).  Count 4 charged 
attempted robbery, see V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 331, 
1862(1), as did Count 5, see V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 331, 
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1862(2).  Count 6 charged the unlawful carrying of a firearm 
during the commission of a crime of violence.  See V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  At trial, Mills took the stand and 
offered a justification of self-defense.  The jury nonetheless 
convicted Mills of all but Count 4. 
 The Government’s case at trial included witness and 
expert testimony, as well as forensic evidence.  The first 
witness was Michael Caines, who was a truck driver for a gas 
company.  Caines testified that, at Mills’s request, he gave 
Mills a ride to the Contant area of St. Thomas and dropped 
him off two houses away from where Clement lived.  He did 
not know why Mills wanted a ride to Contant, but he testified 
that Mills asked him “not to tell [Mills’s] father that I had 
seen him or I had given him a ride.”  J.A. 182:17-20.   
 What transpired next was adduced at trial through the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses, Clement’s wife and brother.  
Clement’s wife testified that just before the killing, she was 
inside their home, talking to Clement about her car while he 
was outside feeding his dog.  Her husband stepped inside, and 
she then heard someone speak to him.  She asked Clement 
who it was, and he responded that it was “some dude who 
come up to my door.”  J.A. 246:3-6.  She heard the man 
repeatedly say “give it to me,” J.A. 246:7-12, and Clement 
respond “[w]hat I have for you? I have nothing for you.  Get 
down on my step,” J.A. 246:13-16.  Clement repeatedly 
called the man “Aswa.”  J.A. 246:17-23.  When Clement’s 
wife looked outside, she saw Mills aiming a gun at her 
husband’s chest.  Clement grabbed Mills, Mills grabbed 
Clement, and they fell down the steps.  Clement’s wife 
initially testified that she saw a gunshot, but later clarified 
that she heard that first gunshot while she went inside to grab 
a bat to help her husband.  When she went back outside, she 
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saw Mills, who was standing over her husband, shoot him a 
second time.  According to her testimony, Clement’s wife 
never saw her husband in possession of the gun, nor did she 
know why Mills had approached him. 
 Clement’s brother testified that when the killing 
occurred, he was frying fish at his mother’s house, which was 
also near Clement’s home.  He heard Clement repeatedly say 
“Aswa, cool out.  Stop it.  I’m not giving you anything.”  J.A. 
195:16-20.  About 30 seconds later, he heard a gunshot and 
looked outside, where he saw Mills—gun in hand—wrestling 
with Clement.  The two fell, and as Mills was getting up, he 
shot Clement twice.  Mills, still holding the gun, fled.  
Clement’s brother heard Clement scream, “I’m going to die 
right here in my yard,” before he died where he lay.  J.A. 
235:2-9.  Clement’s brother never saw Clement in possession 
of the gun, nor did he know what Clement and Mills were 
arguing about.  He did, however, testify that his brother often 
“cut grass for other people . . . so he always have cash in his 
pocket.”  J.A. 238:5-10. 
 Soon after the shooting, a taxi driver in the area who 
was tuned in to the police channel spotted Mills jumping out 
of the back of a moving pickup truck, “running” and 
“ducking” between parked cars before running into some 
trees as though he was trying to hide.  The driver called 911, 
and the police quickly located Mills, who emerged from the 
bushes, wearing no shoes.  After his arrest, Mills waived his 
right to remain silent and his right to counsel.  He then gave a 
statement to the police in which he asserted that just before 
his arrest, the wind blew $10 in cash and fonta leaf2 out of his 
hand and that he was looking for them in the bushes when the 
                                              
 2 Mills testified that fonta is tobacco. 
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police arrested him.  The police recovered neither the cash 
nor the fonta.  Mills also told the police that he had not been 
in the victim’s neighborhood that day, that he had not been in 
a fight that day, that he did not shoot a gun that day, and that 
he did not know Boniface Clement. 
 The physical evidence introduced in the Government’s 
case-in-chief told a very different story.  At the crime scene, 
the police had found an abandoned pair of shoes on the 
ground and over $1,000 in cash on Clement’s body.  In 
addition, Mills’s hand after his arrest tested positive for 
gunshot residue, proving he was near a discharging firearm or 
handled ammunition.  The gun used in the shooting 
apparently was never recovered. 
 A medical examiner also testified at trial.  His autopsy 
revealed that Clement was shot twice.  One bullet entered 
above his left hip, traveled downwards, and was found in in 
his right foot, consistent with Clement being shot while 
standing or sitting.  The other bullet entered his abdomen, 
traveled downwards from front to back and left to right, and 
was recovered in Clement’s pelvic bone.  The trajectory of 
this round, according to the medical examiner, was also 
consistent with him sitting, lying down on his back, or 
possibly standing when shot.  Both trajectories were 
inconsistent with the gun being pointed upwards or 
perpendicular to Clement at the time of discharge.  Further, 
based on the absence of gunpowder residue and soot around 
the gunshot wounds, the medical examiner concluded that 
both shots were fired from at least two or three feet away.  
 After the Government presented this evidence, Mills 
took the stand in his own defense and offered a far different 
account of events than his post-arrest statement.  He 
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acknowledged that he asked Caines, the truck driver, to take 
him to the victim’s neighborhood, but claimed he did so to 
retrieve his Vise-Grip from a man he knew only as “Seala.”  
Seala was never produced by the defense, and Mills offered 
no additional explanation for why he needed his Vise-Grip or 
was seeking it from Seala.  Mills admitted that he was not 
sure that Seala actually lived in the neighborhood but said he 
thought that Seala “hangs out” there.  J.A. 618:15-21.  Mills 
further testified that he told Caines not to tell Mills’s father 
about the ride because his father was Caines’s boss and Mills 
believed his father would be upset that Mills got a ride in a 
company truck.  Mills too had been employed at his father’s 
gas company, but had been “discharged,” J.A. 639:13-15, and 
was unemployed at the time of the shooting.  Nevertheless, he 
claimed to have had $1,000 in his possession when he went 
searching for Seala.  Mills also acknowledged at trial that he 
knew Clement and had played basketball with him.   
 On direct examination, Mills testified that, as he was 
searching for Seala, he saw Clement out in his yard, and 
Clement signaled him over.  When he told Clement that he 
was looking for Seala and had $1,000 and he showed Clement 
a “li’l drill,” J.A. 625:7-17, Clement responded that he was 
selling tools—which Mills understood to mean “a tool . . . 
that you use to fix machinery with”—and told Mills to follow 
him.3  J.A. 625:15-17; 628:22-629:3.  Mills asserted that they 
then went to Clement’s house where Clement stepped inside, 
grabbed a gun from behind the door, and said “don’t go, give 
me everything.”  J.A. 626:2-21.   
                                              
 3 The jury heard a detective testify that “tool” is slang 
for gun.  J.A. 608:25-609:7. 
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 At that point, Mills testified, he believed Clement “was 
going to rob me,” J.A. 629:10, so he grabbed the gun and 
tried to rip it from Clement’s hands, and Clement “started 
bawling” and saying “cool out, cool out,” J.A. 629:19-630:9.  
Mills alleged that he eventually gained possession of the gun 
because he was “kinda bigger than” Clement.  J.A. 630:9.  
Mills then held the gun at his side briefly, told Clement to 
“cool out,” and then offered to give the gun back “so 
[Clement] could cool out,” but Clement did not take it.  J.A. 
631:12-25.  Only minutes later, however, Mills testified that 
Clement had pointed the gun at him and, therefore, Mills 
thought that if Clement “got that gun he might have killed 
me.”  J.A. 633:21-634:7.  On cross-examination, Mills 
testified that he was afraid that Clement was going to hurt 
him with the gun, but he made no mention of offering to give 
the gun back to Clement.  
 Mills further explained that Clement “was saying like, 
something, go down . . ., and I just started backing up off the 
stairs.”  J.A. 632:9-12.  Mills allegedly got “halfway through 
the yard”—and was still in possession of the gun—when 
Clement “run off the stairs and attack me.”  J.A. 632:12-15.  
By Mills’s account, Clement then “ran down in the yard . . . 
look like he pick up something off the ground, grab me by my 
arm with the gun, grab my shirt, like my neck, like he was 
trying to choke me, and I try to get away from him.”  J.A. 
632:19-24.  At that point, Mills said, “I felt scared.  I felt 
overpowered and forced,” J.A. 695:24-25, and “I feel like that 
I was being beat up on,” J.A. 696:4-5.  Mills acknowledged 
that the gun discharged twice when it was in his hand, but he 
denied shooting Clement.  
 After the gun fired, according to Mills, both of them 
fell.  Mills then got up, picked up the gun, and fled through a 
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shortcut near a school, where he dropped the gun and drill 
somewhere along the route.  The $1,000 that Mills testified he 
had in his possession when he encountered Clement was not 
on his person when he was arrested and, according to Mills, 
“[j]ust disappeared” between the killing and his arrest; he 
offered that it must have “fell out my pocket” during the 
struggle with Clement.  J.A. 681:2-9.   
 Mills admitted that after the shooting, he fled and then 
gave a false statement to police, but he claimed that he was 
“in panic,” J.A. 637:18-19, “[b]ecause I was so scared, and I 
know that it would only be time I would have to tell anybody 
anything about the situation is in court.”  J.A. 638:14-17.  
When cross-examined about his statement to the police that 
he lost $10, not $1,000, Mills initially responded that he 
“wouldn’t know” if $10 is “more valuable than” $1,000 and 
then that $10 “could be” more valuable than $1,000 
“[d]epending on [the] situation.”  J.A. 682:6-683:3.  Mills 
also testified that he denied knowing Boniface Clement 
because he knew the victim only as “I.”  The jury convicted 
Mills on all counts but the attempted robbery charged in 
Count 4. 
 Following his conviction, Mills appealed to the 
District Court, raising three claims relevant to this appeal.4  
                                              
 4 Mills raised a sufficiency of the evidence claim in the 
District Court, which that court rejected and which Mills did 
not appeal.  See Mills, 2013 WL 6072020, at *3-5.  Mills also 
argued, and the District Court found, that in his closing, the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for the witnesses and 
mischaracterized the forensic examiner’s testimony.  Mills 
does not press these issues on appeal, however, and they 
therefore are waived.  See, e.g., United States v. Albertson, 
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First, he argued that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct 
that violated due process, namely: (1) repeated suggestions 
that the jurors could not be safe in their homes if Mills was 
free; (2) repeated references to the possibility that the gun 
Mills discarded would endanger schoolchildren and the 
community; and (3) the display throughout closing argument 
of a gruesome crime-scene photo of the victim’s corpse.  
Second, he argued that the self-defense jury instructions were 
improper and required reversal.  Third, Mills claimed that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.   
 The District Court affirmed Mills’s conviction.  
Although the District Court agreed that the prosecutors’ 
conduct was improper and that the jury instructions were 
deficient, it held there was no prejudice.  See Mills, 2013 WL 
6072020, at *6-9.  The District Court also rejected Mills’s 
ineffective assistance claim because the record was not 
sufficiently developed.  Id. at *10.  This timely appeal 
followed.   
                                                                                                     
645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011).  The District Court also 
agreed with Mills that the prosecutors improperly elicited 
victim impact testimony from the victim’s wife.  Mills, 2013 
WL 6072020, at *6-7.  Mills mentions in passing that this 
testimony was “wholly inappropriate,” but he does not argue 
that it violated due process.  Appellant’s Br. at 29 n.7.  That 
argument therefore is also waived.  See John Wyeth & Bros. 
Ltd. v. CIGNA Int'l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing (such as, in a 
footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived.”).  
These additional facts would not alter our conclusion in any 
event. 
 11 
 
III. Discussion 
 On appeal, Mills argues that prosecutorial misconduct 
violated his right to due process; that the trial court’s jury 
instructions concerning self-defense were fatally flawed; and 
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
jury instructions.  We address each argument in turn and 
conclude that there is no basis to overturn Mills’s conviction. 
 A. Due Process Claim 
 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause secures a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.  See United States v. Liburd, 
607 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)).5  When confronted with a 
claim that a prosecutor’s remarks violated this right, we first 
determine whether those remarks constituted misconduct.  
See United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 134-36 (3d Cir. 
2012); United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 194 (3d Cir. 2010).  
If so, we proceed to determine whether that misconduct “so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process,” Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); see also Greer v. 
Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), taking into account “the 
entire proceeding,” Liburd, 607 F.3d at 344 (quoting United 
States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
                                              
 5 The right to due process has “been extended to the 
Virgin Islands” by the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act, 
48 U.S.C. § 1561.  See Liburd, 607 F.3d at 343; see also 
Davis, 561 F.3d at 163 n.3. 
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 Where, as here, a defendant did not object to 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial, we review for plain error.  
Under this standard of review, “before an appellate court can 
correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) ‘error,’ 
(2) that is ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affects substantial rights.’”  
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) 
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).  
“[I]n the ordinary case,” an error affects substantial rights 
when “it ‘affected the outcome of the [lower] court 
proceedings.’”  United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 
(2010) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 
(2009)) (discussing Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52); 
see also Fahie v. People, 59 V.I. 505, 511 (2013) (applying 
the plain error standard from Marcus to a local Virgin Islands 
case).  If these conditions are met, we “may exercise [our] 
discretion to” remedy the error, “but only if . . . the error 
‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.’”  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).  
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the misconduct 
was plain—that is, it was “clear” and “obvious,” Marcus, 560 
U.S. at 262; see infra Section III.A.1, but that the error did 
not affect the outcome of the trial and therefore did not affect 
Mills’s substantial rights, see infra Section III.A.2. 
  1. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 We start with the question of whether the prosecutors’ 
actions amounted to misconduct.  In Mills’s case, the 
prosecutors (1) argued that the jurors’ own safety depended 
upon convicting Mills; (2) suggested that the gun Mills 
discarded would endanger schoolchildren and the community; 
and (3) throughout at least its rebuttal argument at closing, 
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displayed a graphic crime scene photograph of Clement’s 
body. 
   i. References to the Jurors’ Safety 
 Recognizing the pathos of Clement’s last words as he 
lay dying in front of his home, the prosecutors throughout 
their opening and closing statements made references to the 
sanctity of the home.  The opening started off 
unobjectionably when the prosecutor told the jury “[i]t is 
3:40, everyone in this courtroom wants to go home ‘cause 
home is a safe place.  It’s a home sweet home.  There’s no 
place like home.  We have our house there, it’s comfortable, 
we feel safe at home.”  J.A. 163:3-8.  But the prosecutor 
began to veer off course when, instead of steering the 
narrative to what transpired at Clement’s home, he 
admonished the jury to consider the safety of their own: 
“[Y]ou want to get home.  But let me tell you how home 
sweet home and there’s no place like home can be ruined.  It 
can be ruined by Aswa Mills.”  J.A. 163:10-14.   
 The prosecutor continued in this vein: “Home sweet 
home, there’s no place like home unless you have a Aswa 
Mills who come into your house,” J.A. 164:19-21, and “Aswa 
Mills.  Home sweet home, we all want to go home.  We want 
to have the stickiness of a murder, hearing about a murder by 
this defendant, that’s what we here for.  Home sweet home.”  
J.A. 167:7-11.  The prosecutor then expressly linked the 
jurors’ own safety to their verdict: 
Home sweet home.  We have to draw a line in 
the sand.  We got to be safe at our homes.  It’s 
not enough just to lock the door, check that the 
windows are closed.  We got to stop these Aswa 
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Mills from coming to our home and ruining our 
lives.  There’s no place like home.  You 
remember the Wizard of Oz, Dorothy, clicking 
her heals [sic].  No, place like home.  There’s 
no place like home.  We have to be safe in our 
homes.   
JA 171:22-172:7 (emphasis added).  He concluded his 
opening by suggesting that the jurors should secure their own 
safety by returning a guilty verdict: “First degree murder, 
possession of a gun, and robbery, there has to be a place like 
home.  We all want to go home.  We have to be safe at our 
homes.  First degree murder, possession of an unlicensed gun 
and robbery.  Thank you.”  J.A. 172:17-23. 
 This theme continued during the closing argument as 
the prosecutor said, for example, that Mills: 
murdered [the victim] and he ruined his entire 
home.  He ruined the home of his wife [].  He 
ruined the home of his three kids . . . .  He 
ruined the home of his brother [], and his 
mother.  He ruined an entire family’s home.  No 
more home sweet home.   
JA 727:12-19.  The prosecutor made similar comments 
toward the end of the rebuttal closing, observing ominously, 
“[i]t’s a very ugly case.  Someone’s home is torn totally 
upside down, and we know everyone wants to get home 
today.”  J.A. 800:12-15. 
 We conclude that these comments went beyond factual 
description or even legitimate thematic use of the home and 
constituted misconduct.  We have previously criticized such 
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“Golden Rule arguments,” observing that “the propriety of 
‘put yourself in the defendant’s shoes’ argument, as a tool of 
advocacy, is doubtful because it ‘encourages the jury to 
depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of 
personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence.’”  
Edwards v. City of Phila., 860 F.2d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(quoting Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 
1226, 1246 (7th Cir. 1982)).  The same concerns abide when 
an advocate asks the jury to put itself in the victim’s shoes.  
Thus, prosecutors commit misconduct when they “urge jurors 
to identify individually with the victims with comments like 
‘it could have been you’ the defendant killed or ‘it could have 
been your children,’” Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225, 234 
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. Bell, 525 F.3d 466, 484 
(6th Cir. 2008)), or when they “fan the flames of the jurors’ 
fears by predicting that if they do not convict, a crime wave 
or some other calamity will consume their community,” id.  
Yet here, the prosecutors did just that by repeatedly 
suggesting that the jurors themselves were not safe in their 
homes as long as Mills was at large.   
 While prosecutors are not foreclosed from making 
effective use of themes, metaphors, and references to popular 
culture, they may not cross the line and invite the jury to 
render a decision on grounds of bias, passion, prejudice, or 
sympathy.  As even the Government appropriately 
acknowledged at oral argument, that line was crossed here.  
Oral Arg. at 19:50 (argued December 8, 2015).  
   ii. The Missing Gun 
 The prosecutors also capitalized on the fact that the 
police never recovered the gun that Mills tossed near a school 
by emphasizing the danger that Mills had created for the 
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community.  During the opening statement, for example, the 
prosecutor stated, “[t]here’s a gun out there people.  It’s a 
gun, it’s an instrument of death, it has a body on it.”  J.A. 
167:4-6.  Toward the end of the opening, he remarked, “[a]nd 
then we have a gun.  The gun is gone.  This defendant had 
enough time to get rid of the gun.  Anybody can have this 
gun.  Instrument of death.”  J.A. 172:7-11.   
 During its cross examination of Mills, although Mills 
had already acknowledged on direct that he dropped the gun 
in the course of his flight, the Government specifically 
elicited that Mills dropped the gun near a school.  Then, 
during closing, the prosecutor argued:  
He didn’t know where he threw [the gun] away, 
but ladies and gentleman, in that same area are 
not one, but two schools, two schools where 
innocent little kids walk and travel that path.  
They live in that area.  They travel that area all 
the time. 
That gun is out there.  What if one of them finds 
that gun that he so casually threw away?  What 
if one of them finds that gun and accidentally 
shoot one of their friends or some relative?  
That gun has one body on it.  It already ruined 
one home.  Now it’s out there potentially to ruin 
somebody else’s home.     
JA 734:1-14.  And again, in his rebuttal, the prosecutor 
pointed out: 
Ladies and gentleman, there’s a gun somewhere 
in the Contant area if it hadn’t been located or 
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found by some innocent person.  There’s two 
schools over in that area.  There’s children that 
travel that area.  There’s one dead person 
already associated with that gun.     
JA 799:16-800:3. 
 This too was misconduct.  Given that Mills was 
alleged to have shot Clement and was charged with various 
firearms offenses, the prosecutors had a legitimate need to 
elicit testimony that Mills discarded the firearm during flight 
to explain why it was not on his person when he was arrested 
and was never recovered.  But the ongoing threat to 
schoolchildren created by the discarded gun, however 
reprehensible, was not relevant to the particular crimes with 
which Mills was charged.  Raising this specter, therefore, was 
purely “inflammatory,” as the Government to its credit also 
conceded at oral argument.  Oral Arg. at 21:40.6   
   iii. The Use of Clement’s Photo  
    During Closing  
 The third category of alleged misconduct at issue is the 
prosecutors’ display of a crime-scene photograph of 
Clement’s corpse throughout at least the Government’s 
rebuttal closing.7  This photograph shows Clement’s dead 
                                              
 6 Curiously, the Government did not concede that the 
comments were error. 
  
 7 The District Court stated that “[t]he prosecutor 
projected a photo of [the victim], during the entirety of his 
closing argument.”  Mills, 2013 WL 6072020, at *8.  From 
the trial transcript, however, it appears that the photo was 
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body, prone and bloody, at the scene of the shooting.8  The 
trial court characterized the photo as “the one of the deceased 
defendant shot.”  J.A. 803:1-2.  Of all the photos that had 
been admitted into evidence, it was, according to the trial 
court, “the one that [was] gonna provoke the most sympathy.”  
J.A. 802:13-14.  Indeed, the trial court noted that the jury had 
been looking at it “all the time” while it was displayed.  J.A. 
803:12-17.  At the conclusion of the rebuttal closing, the trial 
court, outside the presence of the jury, expressed its “burning 
curiosity” as to why the photo was displayed during closing 
argument when the prosecutor never once made reference to 
it.  J.A. 801:6-21.  The prosecutor’s response was telling: 
“[t]o provoke sympathy.”  J.A. 802:1-2.   
 The display of a photo of this nature for this admitted 
purpose also constituted misconduct.  Indeed, in Berrios, we 
found misconduct based on the display of a far less 
inflammatory photo.  There, the Government displayed a 
puzzle of the victim’s face, ostensibly to dramatize “how 
disparate pieces of evidence fit together.”  676 F.3d at 135.  
In rejecting this justification and finding that there had been 
                                                                                                     
displayed during the Government’s rebuttal closing; the 
transcript does not indicate whether the photo was displayed 
during the Government’s initial closing argument.   
 
 8 Although not expressly stated in the record, we have 
no trouble identifying the photo in question as Exhibit 11 in 
light of the trial court’s description.  At oral argument, the 
Government offered to confirm whether the photo displayed 
was indeed Exhibit 11 but never made a supplemental 
submission. 
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misconduct, we reasoned that “there was no such conceivable 
purpose in using an enlarged photograph of the victim's face 
as the puzzle image,” and “such conduct should not have been 
allowed in court.”  Id.  Likewise, there was no reason to 
display the photo here other than—as expressly stated by the 
prosecutor—to provoke sympathy.  Because such “appeals 
for jurors to decide cases based on passion and emotion 
[arising from sympathy for the victim are] improper,” Moore 
v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 117 (3d Cir. 2001), the prosecutor’s 
display of the photo in this case also rose to the level of 
misconduct. 9   
 Having considered the prosecutors’ actions and the 
relevant case law, we conclude that these tactics, individually 
and collectively, did constitute misconduct.10  See, e.g., 
                                              
 9 As is apparent from the trial court’s colloquy with the 
prosecutors following closing arguments, the trial court 
recognized the impropriety of the use of the victim’s photo 
even as it was being displayed but took no action because 
there was no objection.  The court noted, though, that it 
would do something “next time.”  J.A. 802:3-6.  Mills’s 
counsel told the trial court that he “started to object” to the 
photo but “didn’t want to interrupt.”  J.A. 802:7-8.  The 
preferred course in these situations is of course for defense 
counsel to object, but even in the absence of an objection, a 
trial court that recognizes prosecutorial misconduct taking 
place at trial can and should preserve the integrity of the 
proceedings by intervening sua sponte if necessary.  
 
 10 In holding that the prosecutors’ tactics here 
constitute “prosecutorial misconduct,” we do not conclude, 
nor do we need to conclude, that the prosecutors intended to 
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Berrios, 676 F.3d at 134-36; Lee, 612 F.3d at 194.  We also 
conclude that these errors were plain—that is, they were clear 
or obvious.  See Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262.  We therefore 
proceed to consider their effect on the fairness of the trial. 
  2. Analysis 
 Having found that the prosecutors in Mills’s case 
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, we next consider 
whether the error affected Mills’s substantial rights and the 
fairness and integrity of the proceeding, an inquiry in this 
case that is closely aligned with the Due Process inquiry of 
“whether the misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness 
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process in 
light of the entire proceeding.”11  Liburd, 607 F.3d at 344 
                                                                                                     
commit misconduct or acted in bad faith.  “The critical 
question in assessing constitutional error is to what extent a 
defendant's rights were violated, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor. . . .  A prosecutor’s deliberate acts might have no 
effect at all upon the trier of fact, while acts that might be 
inadvertent could serve to distract the jury from its proper 
task and thus render a defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”  
Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 68 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Prosecutors, however, serve in positions of public trust, and 
must guard against the temptation to draw on jurors’ passions 
instead of the evidence, particularly in the heat of trial.   
 
 11 We have taken inconsistent approaches as to where 
in the analysis of a Donnelley claim we review for 
harmlessness.  In some cases, we have conducted a two-step 
inquiry, subsuming the harmless error inquiry within our 
inquiry into whether the misconduct resulted in an unfair trial.  
See, e.g., Berrios, 676 F.3d at 134-36; Liburd, 607 F.3d at 
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(quoting Morena, 547 F.3d at 194); cf. Marcus, 560 U.S. at 
262 (explaining that an error ordinarily affects substantial 
rights when it “affect[s] the outcome of the [lower] court 
                                                                                                     
342.  In others, we have espoused a three-step approach, 
“not[ing] that we only conduct a harmless error inquiry once 
we decide that constitutional error did occur.  Thus, we first 
examine whether the misconduct so infected the trial as to 
render it unfair.” Marshall, 307 F.3d at 67 n.16.  At least on 
direct review, however, the two-step inquiry will suffice 
because the harmless error standard of Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), “is more demanding than the 
‘fundamental fairness’ inquiry of the Due Process Clause.”  
Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 n.7.  Thus, if the reviewing court 
determines that prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of 
a due process violation, then a fortiori the misconduct is not 
harmless under Chapman.  Id. at 765 & n.7.  If, on the other 
hand, the court determines the misconduct does not rise to the 
level of a due process violation, it has no occasion to 
undertake a harmless error review under Chapman, but may 
nonetheless exercise its supervisory powers to reverse a 
conviction if “it is highly probable that the error did not 
contribute to the judgment,” United States v. Zehrbach, 47 
F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Gov’t of 
the V.I. v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir. 1976)), 
considering “the scope of the objectionable comments and 
their relationship to the entire proceeding, the ameliorative 
effect of any curative instructions given, and the strength of 
the evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction, id.  Mills 
has not sought to invoke our supervisory powers and, in any 
event, their exercise is not warranted here for the reasons set 
forth in this Section. 
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proceedings” (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135); Johnson, 
520 U.S. at 469-70 (explaining that an “error did not 
‘seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings’” because there was “overwhelming” 
evidence supporting the conviction (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. 
at 736).  In making this determination, we consider the 
misconduct “in light of the entire trial, assessing the severity 
of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the 
quantum of evidence against the defendant.”  Lee, 612 F.3d at 
194 (quoting Moore, 255 F.3d at 107).  
 In applying these factors here, we must situate the 
prosecutorial misconduct in this case on the continuum 
established by our precedent.  At one end sits Berrios.  There, 
several defendants were convicted of charges stemming from 
a “series of carjackings, an attempted robbery, and the murder 
of a security guard.”  676 F.3d at 123.  During closing, the 
Government read a poem commemorating the guard, 
presented a large photograph of his face as a puzzle “to show 
the jury how disparate pieces of evidence fit together,” id. at 
135, and briefly referred to a defendant’s time in jail, id. at 
134.  We held that, although “the closing was rife with 
misconduct,” the errors in the closing did not “merit reversal” 
for several reasons.  Id. at 135.  First, the misconduct was not 
pervasive: the poem “was a mere ten lines out of over 
seventy-five pages of closing argument,” while the picture 
was displayed briefly and had already been admitted into 
evidence.  Id.  Second, the court had twice instructed the jury 
not to be swayed by bias, which “sufficiently removed any 
lingering prejudice.”  Id. at 135-36 & n.10.  Third, “the jury 
was presented with ample evidence on which it could convict 
the defendants,” id. at 136, including a wiretap in which two 
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defendants admitted to the crime and implicated another co-
conspirator, id. at 124.   
 At the other end of our continuum sits Moore, in which 
we granted a state inmate’s habeas petition challenging his 
rape and robbery convictions due to prosecutorial 
misconduct.  255 F.3d at 97, 120.  That case turned on the 
identity of the rapist, and the white victim was only able to 
identify the black defendant after being hypnotized.  Id. at 
109-10.  During closing, the prosecutor argued that the jury 
could infer that the defendant had a “preference” for white 
women because his wife was white, id. at 116, and that the 
defendant needed “sexual release” at the time of the rape 
because his wife was then ill, id. at 100-01.  Finally, he told 
the jury that “if you don’t believe [the victim] and you think 
she's lying, then you've probably perpetrated a worse assault 
on her.”  Id. at 101.  We reversed, holding that the “sexual 
release” comment was cured by the trial court’s instructions 
but that even the trial court’s “strong” and specific 
instructions were insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by 
the race-based “preference” and the “perpetrate a worse 
assault” comments taken together.  Id. at 115-18.  Further, the 
“perpetrate a worse assault” comment improperly played to 
the jury’s emotions and buttressed the victim’s credibility and 
reliability when her identification of the defendant was 
crucial to the prosecution’s case.  Id. at 118.  This comment, 
we held, when combined with the “preference” comment, 
resulted in prejudice that implicated due process concerns.  
Id.  Finally, the Government’s case lacked any “strong 
physical, circumstantial, testimonial, or corroborating 
identification evidence linking [the defendant] to the rape.”  
Id. at 119. 
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 Against this backdrop, we now consider in Mills’s case 
the severity and pervasiveness of the misconduct, the curative 
instructions, and the strength of the evidence.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we conclude, on balance, this case is more 
like Berrios than Moore and the errors neither warrant relief 
under the plain error doctrine nor rose to the level of a due 
process violation. 
   i. The Severity and Pervasiveness  
    of the Misconduct 
Berrios and Moore instruct that we consider, first, the 
severity of the conduct and its pervasiveness—that is, the 
number of times or the length of time that the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct.  See, e.g., Berrios, 676 F.3d at 135; 
Moore, 255 F.3d at 118. 
 The misconduct here was both severe and pervasive.  
The photo of the victim’s body traded on the jurors’ 
sympathy and was more prejudicial than the photo and poem 
in Berrios, and the prosecutors’ comments from opening 
through closing regarding the missing gun and the jurors’ 
safety in their homes expressly linked Mills to hypothetical 
acts of violence wholly unrelated to the one for which he was 
being tried.  Moreover, the prosecutor expressly argued that 
finding Mills guilty of the charged offenses was the only way 
the jurors could be safe in their homes.  The severity and 
pervasiveness of the misconduct thus more closely resemble 
that of Moore, where the prosecutor relied on race-based 
arguments to secure a conviction, and weigh in favor of Mills. 
   ii. Curative Instructions 
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 Second, we consider the effect of the curative 
instructions, if any.  Lee, 612 F.3d at 194.  The more severe 
the misconduct, the less effective the curative instructions—
particularly when the curative instructions are not given 
immediately after the misconduct or when they do not direct 
the jury to ignore specific instances of misconduct.  Compare 
Morena, 547 F.3d at 197 (holding that a trial court’s 
instruction reminding the jury that the defendant was not on 
trial for drug offenses did not cure the prejudice from 
evidence concerning the defendant’s drug use and dealing 
because it was “hardly a specific direction to disregard the 
drug evidence”), with Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1267 (finding that 
the trial court cured a prosecutor’s improper vouching when it 
immediately “gave a specific instruction to disregard the 
prosecutor’s comment”).   
 The trial court here instructed the jury before and after 
the evidence was presented that the case must be decided 
based on the evidence, that the lawyers’ statements and 
arguments are not evidence, and that the jury was responsible 
for determining each witness’s credibility.  The court also 
instructed the jury after the evidence was presented that “the 
law does not permit you to be influenced by outside matters 
such as sympathy, bias, prejudice, or any other similar fact or 
factor for or against either side.  You should not and may not 
be influenced . . . by . . . public policy . . .,” J.A. 849:11-18, 
and gave a similar instruction at the beginning of the trial.   
 On the one hand, the trial court did not expressly 
admonish the jury to ignore the specific instances of 
misconduct.  See Morena, 547 F.3d at 197.  On the other 
hand, we have held that instructions similar to those given by 
the trial court here or “a clear and complete jury instruction 
on the elements of the claim asserted and on the allocation of 
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the burdens of proof, whenever given, is sufficient to cure 
harm caused by a ‘Golden Rule’ argument” asking the jurors 
to put themselves in another’s shoes.  Edwards, 860 F.2d at 
574.  And more generally, it is well established that jurors are 
presumed to follow their instructions.  Richardson v. Marsh, 
481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).  Although the instructions were not 
given immediately following some of the misconduct, 
perhaps the most inflammatory misconduct—the display of 
the photograph throughout at least the rebuttal closing—
occurred at the end of trial in close proximity to the 
instructions.  See Berrios, 676 F.3d at 135-36; see also 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1267.  Though a close question, we 
conclude that this factor tilts against Mills.   
   iii. The Strength of the Evidence  
    and Mills’s Defense 
Next, we consider the strength of the evidence against 
the defendant and, when the Government’s case or the 
accused’s defense turns on witness credibility, how the 
misconduct might have affected the jury’s credibility 
determination.  See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 
(1986) (finding no due process violation by improper 
comments in part because the evidence against the defendant 
was “overwhelming”); Berrios, 676 F.3d at 136 (finding no 
due process violation where “the jury was presented with 
ample evidence on which it could convict the defendants”); 
cf. Moore, 255 F.3d at 118-19 (finding that the strength of the 
state’s evidence was not sufficient to overcome the 
prosecutor’s misconduct).  This third factor weighs decisively 
against Mills and is dispositive in this case. 
 There was no dispute at trial concerning the identity of 
the shooter: Mills conceded that he and the victim engaged in 
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a struggle and that Mills had the gun in his hand when it 
discharged.  Indeed, the central question for the jury was 
whether Mills acted in self-defense, as he testified, or whether 
he killed Clement in the course of committing a robbery, V.I. 
Code Ann., tit. 14, § 922(a)(2), and in a “willful, deliberate 
and premeditated killing,” V.I. Code Ann., tit. 14,                  
§ 922(a)(1), as urged by the Government. 
 The Government’s case was supported by 
overwhelming evidence that showed Mills murdered Clement 
in the course of committing a robbery and with premeditation.  
The evidence reflected that Mills was out of work and, thus, 
was financially strapped; that Mills knew Clement and, thus, 
had reason to know that he often had large amounts of cash 
on hand; and that Mills designed a plan to go secretively to 
Clement’s home to rob and kill him if necessary.  There was 
also consistent and corroborated testimony from Clement’s 
wife and brother that Mills was in fact robbing Clement when 
he killed him and that, when he shot Clement, not once but 
twice, he did so deliberately and with intent to kill.  That 
evidence included the wife’s testimony that she heard Mills 
demand something from Clement and both witnesses’ 
testimony that they heard Clement refuse to give Mills 
anything; the wife’s testimony that just after Clement refused 
and before she grabbed a bat and heard a shot, Mills was 
pointing a gun at Clement; and both witnesses’ testimony that 
Mills fired the second shot while standing over Clement, who 
was lying helpless on the ground.  The forensic evidence was 
consistent with this testimony and supported premeditation, 
indicating that Clement was sitting or lying down when he 
was shot and that he was shot from at least two to three feet 
away.  See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 780 F.2d 302, 305 
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding evidence sufficient to support 
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conviction for premeditated murder where, among other 
things, the defendant shot the victim four times—once or 
twice at close range); Codrington v. People, 57 V.I. 176, 190 
(2012) (holding that evidence supported premeditated murder 
conviction where the defendant walked away from the victim, 
returned, and fired a second shot). 
 That Mills was guilty of murder and the other crimes 
for which he was convicted was only reinforced by his 
ensuing flight, his tossing of the gun, and his lies to the 
police.  See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 776-77 
(3d Cir. 1966) (holding that evidence that a defendant’s 
statement to police following a killing, which was 
contradicted by other evidence, supported a finding of 
premeditation). 
 On the other hand, the only evidence that Mills acted 
in self-defense was his own testimony, which lacked 
consistency and was irreconcilable with both the testimony 
and the physical evidence at trial.  At the threshold, Mills’s 
general credibility as a witness was severely undermined by 
his admittedly false post-arrest statement that contradicted his 
trial testimony.  See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 
225-26 (1971).  That testimony, moreover, was itself 
implausible.  For example, Mills’s explanation that he asked 
to be dropped near Clement’s home to retrieve his Vise-Grip 
from “Seala” lacked any corroboration or even context in 
Mills’s testimony.  Likewise, it defied credulity that 
Clement—who, according to his wife, was then feeding his 
dog in the backyard—beckoned Mills over and tried to rob 
him.  Neither Clement’s wife nor his brother corroborated this 
account, and, on the contrary, both eyewitnesses heard Mills 
make demands of Clement and Clement rebuff those 
demands, not vice-versa.   
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 At other points, Mills’s testimony was internally 
inconsistent and illogical.  For example, Mills testified on 
both direct and cross examination that he was afraid that 
Clement was going to hurt him because Clement had pointed 
a gun at him.  But Mills testified on direct examination that he 
took the gun from Clement and then immediately offered to 
give it back to Clement so that Clement could “cool out.”  
J.A. 631:23-632:7.  This account not only defies common 
sense but was conspicuously absent in Mills’s cross-
examination.  Mills also asserted that after he backed off of 
Clement’s stairs and was halfway through the yard, Clement 
rushed him—even though Mills was in possession of the gun 
and Clement was apparently unarmed.  This too strains 
credulity. 
 Finally, Mills’s testimony was directly contradicted by 
the forensic evidence.  For instance, Mills claimed that he did 
not shoot Clement intentionally but, instead, that the gun in 
his hand somehow discharged, twice, in the course of a 
struggle.  Clement’s wife, however, saw Mills pointing the 
gun at her husband’s chest before the first shot, and both 
witnesses testified that Mills delivered a second shot while 
standing over Clement, who was lying on the ground.  The 
medical examiner, moreover, testified that both shots were 
fired from at least two to three feet away, which was 
consistent with the eyewitness testimony and irreconcilable 
with Mills’s account of the shooting. 
 In view of the overwhelming evidence that Mills 
committed the offenses for which he was convicted and did 
not act in self-defense, and Mills’s own inconsistent 
statements that undermined his credibility, we are convinced 
that it had no “prejudicial . . . impact” on “the jury’s finding 
of guilt.”  Moore, 255 F.3d at 113; see also Walker v. Horn, 
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385 F.3d 321, 336 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that “a substantial 
amount of other evidence,” including the plaintiff’s 
inconsistent statements, undermined the plaintiff’s credibility 
such that it was “highly improbable” that the erroneous 
admission of impeachment evidence “had an impact on the 
outcome of the trial”).  We conclude, therefore, that while the 
prosecutors in this case stepped far over the line of what is 
acceptable at trial, that misconduct was more than 
counterbalanced by the strength of the evidence and thus did 
not affect Mills’s substantial rights, see Marcus, 560 U.S. at 
262; see also Darden, 477 U.S. at 182, or render Mills’s trial 
fundamentally unfair, see, e.g., Greer, 483 U.S. at 765; 
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. 
 B. Self-Defense Jury Instruction 
 We turn next to Mills’s argument that portions of the 
trial court’s jury instructions concerning self-defense were 
erroneous.  “We generally exercise plenary review in 
[determining] ‘whether the jury instructions stated the proper 
legal standard,’ and review the refusal to give a particular 
instruction or the wording of instructions for abuse of 
discretion.”  United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 
507-08 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Again, however, where, as here, 
there is no objection at trial, “we review only for plain error.”  
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Fonseca, 274 F.3d 760, 765 (3d Cir. 
2001).  
 When reviewing a trial court’s charge to the jury, 
“[j]ury instructions must be read as a whole.”  Flores, 454 
F.3d at 157 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Del. Dep’t of Health and 
Soc. Servs., 865 F.2d 1408, 1418 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (“It is well 
 31 
 
established that [a jury] instruction ‘may not be judged in 
artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the context of 
the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” (quoting 
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).  We will 
affirm the district court when “the charge as a whole fairly 
and adequately submits the issues in the case to the jury.”  
Fonseca, 274 F.3d at 767 (quoting United States v. Thayer, 
201 F.3d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. 
Tai, 750 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2014).  Therefore, an 
instruction that is “erroneous on its own may be remedied by 
the balance of the court's instructions.”  Berrios, 676 F.3d at 
137. 
 In the Virgin Islands, a homicide is justifiable on self-
defense grounds where (1) the defendant actually believed at 
the time of the killing that he “was in imminent or immediate 
danger of his life or great bodily harm,” and (2) this belief 
was reasonable.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 43.  That is, 
self-defense has both a subjective and an objective prong.  
The Government has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-
defense.  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 683-84 (3d 
Cir. 1991).12 
                                              
 12 The Virgin Islands Code contains numerous statutes 
delineating when a homicide is justifiable or excusable.  See, 
e.g., V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 41 (“Resistance by party to be 
injured”); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 42 (“Resistance by other 
parties”); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 43 (“Self-defense”); V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 44 (“Justifiable use of force”); V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, § 293 (“Lawful violence, what constitutes”); V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 926 (“Excusable homicide defined”); V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 927 (“Justifiable homicide defined”).  In 
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 Mills objects that the trial court’s self-defense 
instructions did not encapsulate the principle that “self-
defense hinges on the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
subjective beliefs.”  Appellant’s Br. at 16.  Specifically, Mills 
points to two sentences from the Territorial Court’s 
instructions: 
The circumstances under which a defendant 
acted must have been such as to produce in the 
mind of a reasonable prudent person, similarly 
situated, the reasonable belief that the other 
person was about to kill him or to do him 
serious bodily harm.   
JA 830:8-13.  
[Self-]defense hinges on the defendant’s 
objective belief [of] imminent danger of death 
or serious bodily harm are not on the objective 
reasonableness of the belief.  Therefore, in 
evaluating whether the defendant’s objective 
belief of imminent danger from Mr. Boniface 
Clement was reasonable, you may consider . . . .   
JA 834:9-15 (emphasis added).   
 These statements give us pause.  Considered in 
isolation, they minimize the importance of the defendant’s 
                                                                                                     
view of Mills’s reliance on Smith, which discusses Virgin 
Islands Code title 14, section 43, we construe his challenge to 
be that the trial court did not properly instruct the jury as to 
the requirements of section 43 and tailor our discussion 
accordingly.   
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subjective belief, which was important to the question of self-
defense in this case.  Further, the use of the phrase “hinges 
on” risked focusing the jury’s attention on the objective 
component to the exclusion of the subjective one. 
 However, at multiple other points during the 
instructions, the trial court properly instructed the jury that 
self-defense under § 43 has both subjective and objective 
prongs.  For example, the court instructed: 
To justify a homicide on the ground of self-
defense, there must be not only the belief but 
also reasonable grounds for believing that at the 
time of the killing . . . the party killing was in 
imminent or immediate danger of life or great 
bodily harm.  
JA 828:19-829:1 (repeated almost verbatim at J.A. 829:7-13). 
If the defendant was not the aggressor and had 
reasonable grounds to believe and actually did 
believe he was in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily harm from which he could have 
saved himself only by using deadly force . . . 
then he had a right to employ deadly force . . . .   
JA 829:16-23. 
[T]he defendant must have actually believe he 
was in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily harm . . . .   
JA 830:14-16. 
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[I]f the defendant had reasonable ground to 
believe and actually did believe that he was in 
imminent danger [of] death [or] serious bodily 
harm, and deadly force was necessary . . ., he 
was justified in using deadly force and self-
defense even though it may afterward have 
turned out that the appearances were false.   
 
JA 831:6-14 (repeated almost verbatim at J.A. 833:24-834:7).  
Thus, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury as to the 
correct standard—that self-defense contains both an objective 
and a subjective prong.   
 In sum, while there are deficiencies in two sentences 
of the instructions taken in isolation, we cannot say that the 
instructions taken as a whole amounted to error, much less 
plain error.  See Flores, 454 F.3d at 158-59 (finding no plain 
error where a trial court once instructed the jury, erroneously, 
that the defendant bore the burden of proof to disprove willful 
blindness, but other portions of the instructions “repeatedly 
imposed the burden of proving willful blindness on the 
Government”); see also Tai, 750 F.3d at 316 (“When the 
instructions are read as a whole, it is clear that no jury could 
conclude that [the defendant] bore the burden of proof as to 
any aspect of his knowledge and the District Court committed 
no error in connection with its willful blindness instruction.”).  
 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 Mills also alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for his failure to object to the jury instructions.  However, as a 
general matter, we “do[] not entertain a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal.  Among the reasons 
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that such a claim is not usually cognizable on direct appeal is 
the very important fact that there will not, in the typical case, 
exist a record developed enough to assess the efficacy of 
defense counsel.”  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 
157, 163 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).   
 Here, we agree with the District Court that the record 
is not sufficiently developed because we do not have evidence 
of “counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error” and 
cannot determine whether the failure to object was “sound 
trial strategy.”  Id. at 168.  We therefore decline to reach 
Mills’s ineffective assistance claim. 
IV. Conclusion 
 A prosecutor “may prosecute with earnestness and 
vigor—indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike 
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”  Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  The prosecutors in 
this case went out of bounds and the District Court, as referee, 
called foul.  But in view of the overwhelming evidence 
against Mills, the sheer implausibility of his defense, and the 
trial court’s curative instructions, this District Court properly 
concluded that foul did not rise to the level of a due process 
violation and that Mills’s other claims do not warrant relief.  
We therefore will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
